Deforestation, leakage and avoided deforestation policies: a spatial analysis by Delacote, Philippe et al.
Deforestation, leakage and avoided 
deforestation policies: a spatial analysis 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Creative Commons: Attribution­Noncommercial­No Derivative Works 4.0 
Delacote, P., Robinson, E. J. Z. and Roussel, S. (2016) 
Deforestation, leakage and avoided deforestation policies: a 
spatial analysis. Resource and Energy Economics, 45. pp. 
192­210. ISSN 0928­7655 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2016.06.006 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/66090/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
Published version at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2016.06.006 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2016.06.006 
Publisher: Elsevier 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Accepted Manuscript
Title: Deforestation, Leakage and Avoided Deforestation
Policies: A Spatial Analysis
Author: Philippe Delacote Elizabeth J.Z. Robinson Se´bastien
Roussel
PII: S0928-7655(16)30173-7
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.reseneeco.2016.06.006
Reference: RESEN 989
To appear in: Resource and Energy Economics
Received date: 21-12-2014
Revised date: 29-3-2016
Accepted date: 30-6-2016
Please cite this article as: Philippe Delacote, Elizabeth J.Z. Robinson, Se´bastien
Roussel, Deforestation, Leakage and Avoided Deforestation Policies: A
Spatial Analysis, <![CDATA[Resource and Energy Economics]]> (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2016.06.006
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication.
As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript.
The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof
before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that
apply to the journal pertain.
Page 1 of 74
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Deforestation, Leakage and Avoided Deforestation Policies:
A Spatial Analysis
Philippe Delacote 1 2 3 Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson 4 5 Sébastien Roussel 6 7
March 25, 2016
1Laboratoire d’Economie Forestière, INRA, AgroParisTech, 54000, Nancy, France
2Chaire d’Économie du Climat, Paris, France
3Contact: philippe.delacote@nancy.inra.fr
4University of Reading, School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, United Kingdom
5Contact: e.j.robinson@reading.ac.uk
6Université Paul Valéry Montpellier 3 (UPVM3), UMR 5474 LAMETA, F-34000 Montpellier, France
7Contact: sebastien.roussel@lameta.univ-montp1.fr, sebastien.roussel@univ-montp3.fr
Page 2 of 74
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of several avoided deforestation policies within a patchy forested
landscape. Central is the idea that one neighbour’s deforestation actions may impact the returns
to deforestation in nearby patches. We determine the impact of each policy in terms of avoided
deforestation and leakage levels at the landscape scale through modelling and simulations. Avoided
deforestation policies at a landscape level are respectively: two Payment for Environmental Services
(PES) policies, one focused on deforestation hotspots, the second being equally available to all
agents; a conservation area; and, an agglomeration bonus. Because our model accommodates
spatial interactions in the absence of a deforestation policy, it is possible that a spatial policy
can affect both within-intervention areas and outside-intervention spatial spillovers in terms of
leakage across different landowners’ forest patches. These two different elements of the total extent
of displacement across the full landscape have not been considered before. Our contribution is
twofold. In terms of methodology, we expand the concept of leakage in accounting for direct impacts
to adjacent patches and spatial spillovers over the landscape, and we provide a measure of leakage
in a dynamic manner for policy assessment. From our analytical model and simulations, we show
that leakage is sensitive to the spatial distribution of forest patch types. The two PES policies are
the most cost-effective policies regarding avoided deforestation. The agglomeration bonus policy is
efficient at the expense of a higher cost, while the conservation area policy is efficient when patches
with similar characteristics are gathered.
Keywords: Avoided deforestation, Leakage, Payments for environmental services, Conservation
area, Agglomeration bonus, Spatial analysis.
JEL classification: C63, O13, Q23, Q54.
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Highlights of manuscript “Deforestation, Leakage and Avoided Deforestation Policies: A 
Spatial Analysis” 
 
→ Agents spatial distribution impact avoided deforestation policies effectiveness. 
 
→ The leakage and avoided deforestation patterns of four policies are analyzed.  
 
→ Agglomeration bonuses reduce leakage, decrease the incentive to reduce deforestation. 
 
 
 
*Highlights (for review)
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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of several avoided deforestation policies within a patchy forested
landscape. Central is the idea that one neighbour’s deforestation actions may impact the returns
to deforestation in nearby patches. We determine the impact of each policy in terms of avoided
deforestation and leakage levels at the landscape scale through modelling and simulations. Avoided
deforestation policies at a landscape level are respectively: two Payment for Environmental Services
(PES) policies, one focused on deforestation hotspots, the second being equally available to all
agents; a conservation area; and, an agglomeration bonus. Because our model accommodates
spatial interactions in the absence of a deforestation policy, it is possible that a spatial policy
can affect both within-intervention areas and outside-intervention spatial spillovers in terms of
leakage across different landowners’ forest patches. These two different elements of the total extent
of displacement across the full landscape have not been considered before. Our contribution is
twofold. In terms of methodology, we expand the concept of leakage in accounting for direct impacts
to adjacent patches and spatial spillovers over the landscape, and we provide a measure of leakage
in a dynamic manner for policy assessment. From our analytical model and simulations, we show
that leakage is sensitive to the spatial distribution of forest patch types. The two PES policies are
the most cost-effective policies regarding avoided deforestation. The agglomeration bonus policy is
efficient at the expense of a higher cost, while the conservation area policy is efficient when patches
with similar characteristics are gathered.
Keywords: Avoided deforestation, Leakage, Payments for environmental services, Conservation
area, Agglomeration bonus, Spatial analysis.
JEL classification: C63, O13, Q23, Q54.
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1 Introduction
High rates of deforestation and forest degradation continue to be of concern in many Low and
Middle-Income Countries (LMICs), particularly so in the context of climate change and the role
of forests in carbon sequestration. Where forests are owned and managed by private individuals,
these private agents choose their optimal rate of deforestation based on the relative private costs
and benefits of converting land. However, these forests may provide additional benefits that are not
captured by the agent themselves, thus resulting in socially suboptimal levels of forest conversion.
In the context of climate change, governments can attempt to influence private agents’ decisions
over how much of their forestland to convert to agriculture so as to align private and socially
optimal choices. Governments might variously rely on regulation, the introduction of conservation
areas or economic incentives such as Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES).
Increasingly it is recognised both in the literature and by policy makers that the impact and
efficacy of such policies depend not just on the specific details of the intervention, but also on spatial
interactions across the forest landscape, and in particular, on the extent of "leakage". In the context
of greenhouse-gas emissions and the REDD+ (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation) mechanism, leakage is the term given to a "net increase of greenhouse-gas emissions
in an area outside the project resulting from the [project] activity" (Schwarze et al., 2002), and oc-
curs "whenever the spatial scale of intervention is inferior to the full scale of the targeted problem"
(Wunder, 2008). Leakage is recognized in the Bali Action Plan - COP 13 as a "displacement of
emissions" whereby a reduction in greenhouse-gas emissions in one area (or activity) leads to higher
emissions in another area (or activity). Such leakage can occur through so-called "activity-shifting
leakage" whereby individuals responsible for deforesting and forest degradation shift some or all
of their activity from the more protected REDD forest to a less protected location (Aukland et
al., 2003, van Oosterzee et al., 2012); or "market or partial / general equilibrium leakage" (Gan
and McCarl, 2007; Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2009; Rosendahl and Strand, 2011; Carbone, 2013) in
which the leakage is transmitted through markets, reflected in changes in price for forest resources.1
Addressing leakage has been widely recognised as a major challenge when designing climate mit-
igation policies that incorporate a REDD+ scheme (Wunder, 2008; Albers and Robinson, 2013).
1Leakage has similarly been referred to with respect to conservation policies. For example, evaluation of the U.S.
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) (Wu, 2000; Wu et al., 2001; Roberts and Bucholtz, 2005; Lichtenberg and
Smith-Ramirez, 2011), highlighted substitution slippage (activity-shifting-based leakage) and output-price slippage
(market-based leakage) as reducing the policy effectiveness.
1
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Thus, whilst a particular initiative might be demonstrated to be successful in terms of reducing
deforestation within the project boundaries, if deforestation is displaced outside the project area,
then the actual effectiveness of the policy will be lowered.
Only a small number of papers in the literature have developed explicitly spatial models of
leakage towards deforestation and public policies. Among them, Murray et al. (2004) explore the
impact of leakage from a reserve to a forested area outside a reserve through a "price-induced supply
response". The presence of a reserve creates an excess demand for timber relative to the reduced
supply, the price rises, and the excess demand is met from outside the reserve. Gan and McCarl
(2007) develop a theoretical model of transnational leakage. Again, the mechanism is through
prices, and the extent of leakage is determined by the price elasticities of supply and demand for
forest products. Robinson et al. (2011) demonstrate theoretically that reduced deforestation due to
the implementation of a protected area is likely to increase nearby deforestation when labour and
product markets are not functioning efficiently, but have no local impact when markets are efficient.
Delacote and Angelsen (2015) propose an understanding of the pattern of shifting activities that
may create leakage between agricultural expansion and forest products harvesting: when land and
labour are complements in the net return function of the households, a policy aiming at reducing
deforestation may indirectly increase forest degradation.
In addition to these contributions, there is a growing body of literature that aims at evaluating
policy effectiveness whilst combining modeling and empirical strategy in taking into account net
effects of leakage (Wear and Murray, 2004; Murray, 2008; Honey-Roses et al., 2011; Miteva et
al., 2011; Alix-Garcia et al., 2012; Baylis et al., 2013; Sims, 2014). In particular, Alix-Garcia et
al. (2012) propose an evaluation of Mexico’s national payments for hydrological services program
Pago por Servicios Ambientales-Hidrológico (PSAH) under both types of slippage. They show that
this PES program had relatively moderate impacts on deforestation between 2003 and 2006. They
provide evidence for both types of leakage, of which the substitution slippage effect reduced avoided
deforestation by about 4%. Sims (2014) studies the impacts of wildlife sanctuaries and national
parks in North and Northeast Thailand that are strictly protected areas. She develops and applies
an approach for retrospective empirical evaluation of policy impacts on habitat fragmentation,
whilst dividing regional landscapes into "micro-landscapes" to assess whether and to what extent
protected areas prevented forest loss and fragmentation. She shows that forest cover increased
by an estimated 19%, whereas average forest patch size and maximum forest patch size increased
respectively by 25% and by 21%, compared to a counterfactual scenario of no protection.
2
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Yet even without explicit policy interventions, there are likely to be spatial interactions due
to deforestation choices in one area influencing those in other areas, that is, non-policy-induced
leakage. Indeed, Robalino and Pfaff (2012) suggest that "interactions should be considered in pre-
dicting deforestation over space and time (...) when designing spatial incentive schemes." They find
empirically in Costa Rica that for a given location, neighboring deforestation raises the probabil-
ity of deforestation, an example of negative leakage, or complementarity in clearing (the opposite
finding would be an example of classic leakage, or substitutability in clearing). This observation
raises the possibility of strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity, either in clearing
or in conservation (Robalino and Pfaff, 2012).2 These observations suggest that there is a need to
analyse situations of strategic interaction before any governmental interventions, thus recognizing
non-policy induced leakage, in addition to policy-induced leakage.3
In this paper, we develop a spatial model of deforestation that takes explicit account of spatial
interactions (leakage) both before and after a policy intervention designed to reduce the overall rate
of deforestation. In doing so we identify both conventional leakage outside of an intervention area
due to a spatial policy, and the additional spatial spillovers that occur among areas of land within
the intervention area. This leakage that is within the intervention area, due to the interaction
of policy and natural spatial interdependencies, occurs because the intervention area encompasses
areas of land which, though all are affected by the policy, are owned and managed independently
by different agents who take account of this internal leakage. As such, our paper contributes to
the growing literature on REDD+, by incorporating localised spatial spillovers - internal leakage
- due to the strategic interactions among landowners who are affected by a common REDD+
policy, something that has not been addressed to date in the literature.4 In addition to adjacent
patches being linked through localised spatial spillovers such that one neighbour’s deforestation
actions may impact the returns to deforestation to those around them, we accommodate a second
explicitly spatial aspect of forest landscapes by allowing forest patches to be heterogeneous in terms
of the returns to forestry that they offer.
2Amin et al. (2014) and Sauquet et al. (2014) present cases of spatial strategic interactions between municipalities
in Brazil, which can be considered as leakage in a situation of strategic substitutability.
3In connection with these strategic interactions and the impact of policy implementation, one has to observe the
sign of leakage. Baylis et al. (2013) (following Armsworth et al. (2006) or Oliveira et al. (2007)) states that “more
commonly, leakage is positive resulting from increased pressure to deforest in adjacent lands, relocation of indigenous
communities from protected areas to adjacent areas or by preemptive clearing of forest by landowners around newly
created restricted-use areas” .
4Though we recognize the importance of forest degradation for climate and REDD+, in this paper we restrict our
analysis to deforestation.
3
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We explore the implications of four policies aimed at reducing deforestation at a landscape level:
two PES policies, that can be likened to REDD+ policies - one focused on deforestation hotspots,
the second being equally available to all agents (Bond et al., 2009; Alix-Garcia and Wolff, 2014);
a conservation area (Sims, 2014; Amin et al., 2014); and an agglomeration bonus that rewards
adjacent patches of lower deforestation in a spatially structured landscape (Parkhurst and Shogren,
2008; Wätzold and Drechsler, 2014). We determine the impact of each policy in terms of avoided
deforestation and leakage levels at the landscape scale, relative to the no-policy scenario, through
modelling and simulations. Because our model takes account of spatial interactions in the absence
of a deforestation policy, it accommodates spatial policy that can affect both within-intervention
areas and outside-intervention spatial spillovers in terms of leakage. These two different elements
of the total extent of displacement across the full landscape have not been considered before. Our
contribution is thus twofold. First, as a conceptual framework, we expand the concept of leakage
to account for direct impacts to adjacent patches and spatial spillovers over the landscape, thereby
providing a measure of leakage in a dynamic manner for policy assessment. Second, from our
analytical model and simulations, we show that leakage is sensitive to the spatial distribution of
forest patch types. Our model demonstrates that the optim l policy depends on both costs and the
spatial landscape. Specifically, the two PES policies are the most cost-effective policies regarding
avoided deforestation. The agglomeration bonus policy is most effective in reducing leakage but at
a higher cost, while the conservation area policy is most effective when patches are clustered.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present our spatial model.
In Section 3, we describe the policies that aim to reduce deforestation and consider their implications
in terms of avoided deforestation and leakage at the landscape scale. In Section 4, we provide a
simulation analysis to illustrate how spatial patterns of deforestation evolve over time, depending
on the spatial distribution and the interdependences between patches within this landscape, and
we compare those policy options in terms of avoided deforestation, leakage and cost-effectiveness
at the landscape scale. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The model
The model is set up in the following way. We consider a landscape comprising a finite number of
adjacent forest patches of equal size - a priori uniform cells in a grid. Each forest patch is managed
individually by one agent. At the beginning of each period, each agent chooses how much of their
individual forest patch to deforest, so as to maximise their individual net present returns. To isolate
4
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spatial interactions, we assume that agents only get value from converting forest land. Thus we
consider an agent’s net present return to deforesting as follows.
max
Dit
piit(Dit, Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1) (1)
The payoff obtained from deforestation is increasing and concave ( ∂piit∂Dit > 0;
∂2piit
∂D2it
< 0).
Agent i’s payoff in a specific period is a function of their own chosen deforestation level Dit;5
the exogenous characteristics of that agent’s forest patch, Xit, such as slope and access to markets;
and the agent’s neighbours’ previous-period deforestation decisions on the adjacent forest patches
in the landscape, Djt−1, combined with the distance (or intensity of interaction), αij , from those
neighbours. The neighbours’ previous-period choices combined with the intensity of the interaction
together determine the size of a spatial externality. This externality is a recursive relationship
between agent i’s current deforestation and its neighbours j’s previous-period deforestation levels.
αij close to 0 indicates relatively small interactions whilst, αij close to 1 indicates relatively large
interactions. Thus the model is constructed such that the optimal per-period level of deforestation
for any particular agent only changes over time due to the neighbour interaction term, and so with
no interaction, each agent deforests at a constant rate over time.
Equation (1) is a reduced form equation that is consistent with local market-based leakage.
For example, it can represent the profit maximization behavior of individuals when the selling
price at one location is influenced by the amount being sold by neighbours, such as due to localized
markets created by poor infrastructure and resulting high transport costs (Alix-Garcia et al., 2012).
Equally, it is consistent with activity-shifting leakage such as due to the migration of agricultural
labourers from one patch to another which changes the equilibrium price of labor. In each case,
relative prices change due to localized imperfect markets (Robinson et al., 2011) (see Appendix A
for more details on the microeconomic foundations of Equation (1)).
The first-order conditions from Equation (1) implicitly gives the optimal level of deforestation
D∗it of agent’s patch, which in turn depends on that patch’s own characteristics and the neighbours’
previous optimal deforestation levels D∗jt−1:
D∗it = Dit(Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijD
∗
jt−1) (2)
5Any deforestation is permanent (such as conversion to agriculture), and so there is no forest regeneration term.
However, an agent could choose to actively reforest, in which case the forest cover would increase, and would be
indicated by a negative deforestation term.
5
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The level of net deforestation at time t across the landscape is given by:
Dt =
∑
i
D∗it (3)
A spatial externality occurs when a change in one agent’s level of deforestation results in a
change in the marginal payoff of their neighbours, and thus their neighbours’ optimal choice of
deforestation. A spillover takes place if a previous decrease (resp. increase) in agent j’s deforestation
increases (resp. decreases) agent i’s deforestation: ∂D
∗
it
∂D∗jt−1
< 0. It is straightforward to show that
this is true whenever: ∂piit∂Dit∂(αijDjt−1) < 0. The spatial externality is stronger when αij is larger.
By structuring our model in this way, for any patch, any change in the rate of deforestation from
period one is therefore due solely to spatial interactions with neighbouring patches, and thus non-
policy-induced leakage can be identified clearly. Time t = 0 defines the initial conditions without
spatial interactions. Thus deforestation at time t = 0 is given by D∗i0 = Dit(Xit, 0), and this is the
steady level of deforestation that each agent would experience each period (until no forest in their
patch remained) if αij = 0, that is, if there were no spatial interactions.
For simplicity and to further explore our model, we consider in the following sections that the
type of forest patch is invariant across time, i.e., Xit = Xi at any time period t. Moreover, we
accommodate two types of forest patch. If Xi = X, the direct benefits of deforestation in that patch
are high. If Xi = X, the direct benefits of deforestation in that patch are low. We solve our model
for two ex ante spatial distribution patterns, one in which patch types are "clustered", and another
one in which patch types are "dispersed" . In a clustered case, adjacent forest patches tend to be
of the same type. In contrast, in a dispersed case, adjacent forest patches tend to be of different
types. The dispersed case could be a proxy for a landscape which has some forest patches where the
potential returns to agriculture are high, making deforestation more attractive, and others where
the returns are low, perhaps driven by varying elevation, land fertility, access to water, or access to
markets. We consider here that only direct neighbours’ choices over deforestation influence agent
i’s payoff. Thus, αij ∈ [0; 1] if i and j are direct neighbours, αij = 0 if not.6 We allow for two levels
of interaction: low α, and high α. To sum up, these features allow for a spatial distribution over a
landscape with a spatial dispersion of heterogeneity in returns. In other words, forest patches are
heterogeneous in terms of the returns to forestry that they offer.
6Nevertheless, the model could also apply for homogeneous spatial effects over the patches space. This may bring
different results.
6
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3 Avoided deforestation policies and leakage
When a policy is implemented, additional policy-induced spatial spillovers are created. In this
section we explicitly expand the concept of leakage to include both within- and outside-intervention
spatial spillovers.
***** Figure Expanding the concept of leakage here*********
First, "treated" agents whose patches lie within a policy intervention area change their optimal
deforestation choices in response to the policy. These new deforestation decisions change relative
prices for agents on adjacent "non-treated" patches outside the intervention area that are not di-
rectly affected by the policy. This is the usual definition of leakage. In addition, treated patches
can affect adjacent treated patches; and non-treated patches that are affected by treated patches
in turn can have an impact on adjacent non-treated and treated patches. Thus our broader def-
inition of leakage is needed, i.e., the change in deforestation related to spatial interactions and
spillovers due to a policy over and above any spatial interactions that occur without the policy.
We thus distinguish "TNT leakage" (Treated Non-Treated, i.e., strict definition of leakage between
treated and non treated), "TT leakage" (Treated Treated, i.e., within treated policy-induced spatial
spillover), and "NTNT leakage" (Non-Treated Non-Treated, i.e., within non treated policy-induced
spatial spillover). NTNT leakage can be considered a form of "secondary" leakage, a consequence
of "primary" TNT leakage, that can be positive or negative.
As an example, imagine the simple case of three patches, denoted as A, B and C, each managed
by a distinct agent. A is B’s neighbour, and B is also C’s neighbour. A policy is implemented
on patch A, and Agent A responds by reducing their deforestation. This deforestation reduction
in A increases deforestation in B (primary TNT leakage), an example of localized policy-induced
spillovers. The increased deforestation in B (due to a policy enacted in patch A) similarly leads to
a decrease in deforestation in C (secondary NTNT leakage).
We assess policy options for reducing deforestation in our spatial setting. With regards to each
policy option, the Avoided Deforestation (AD) at time t is measured in the following way:
ADt = DBAUt −DPolt (4)
Where DBAUt and DPolt are respectively the deforestation level in the Business-As-Usual (BAU)
scenario and the deforestation level with a policy option at the landscape scale (following Equation
(3)).7
7With DBAUit = D∗it, ∀i.
7
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We explicitly consider the impact of the policy in terms of leakage both on the specific forest
patches where the policy is implemented and over the landscape. Spatial interactions are recursive
in our model, and they are the only source of dynamics. Therefore there is no policy-induced leakage
in the first year of policy implementation. Thus, the difference between avoided deforestation at
time greater than 1 (t > 1) and avoided deforestation at time 1 (t = 1) is the result of the spatial
interactions that are due to the policy implementation (both within-intervention areas and outside-
intervention spatial spillovers). Leakage (L) at time t is measured in the following way:
Lt = ADt −AD1 (5)
According to Murray et al. (2004) and Murray (2008), leakage is indirectly observable as it is
a market phenomenon, and it must be estimated using economic data and models. Its magnitude
is expressed as follows (for more details, see the mathematical form in Murray et al. (2004)): L
= greenhouse-gas emissions shifted elsewhere / greenhouse-gas emissions directly reduced by the
policy. In our spatially finite landscape and to assess and compare the impact of policy imple-
mentation over time, we choose a metrics that allowing for variation in leakage from an avoided
deforestation target in period t = 1.8
We focus on four policy options in our analysis that are respectively:
• A "hotspot" Payment for Environmental Services (PES) policy that focuses on deforestation
hotspots (PESh);
• A "full" PES policy applied to all agents (PESf);9
• A Conservation Area policy (CA);
• An Agglomeration Bonus policy (AB).
These policies and their assessment are presented in the following subsections.
3.1 Hotspot payment for environmental services policy
The hotspot PES policy (PESh) focuses on patches where there is a higher deforestation rate
in the absence of policy (X-patches). On these patches, the policy maker offers a payment ph to
8One could design metrics introducing other issues at the patch level like forest fragmentation for example following
Sims (2014). However, this is beyond the scope of our paper.
9We may underline that in our setting the PES is implemented also in patches where agents reforest effectively.
In this case, the PES takes the form of a reforestation incentive.
8
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each agent per unit of avoided deforestation.10 Agent i’s payoff thus becomes:
max
Dit
piit(Dit, Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1) + ph(DBAUit −Dit), ∀i ∈ [X] (6)
max
Dit
piit(Dit, Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1), ∀i ∈ [X] (7)
WhereDBAUit is the deforestation level for agent i in the BAU scenario and ph is the hotspot PES
incentive. The first-order conditions of the two kinds of agents bring the equilibrium deforestation
level under the hotspot PES policy:
∂piit
∂Dit
− ph = 0 ↔ DPEShit = Dit(Xit,
∑
j∈[X]
αijD
PESh
jt +
∑
j∈[X]
αijD
PESh
jt , ph), ∀i ∈ [X] (8)
∂piit
∂Dit
= 0 ↔ DPEShit = Dit(Xit,
∑
j∈[X]
αijD
PESh
jt +
∑
j∈[X]
αijD
PESh
jt ), ∀i ∈ [X] (9)
Comparing Equation (8) to Equation (2) makes clear that agents with X-patches will decrease
their deforestation, DPEShi , when there is a hotspot PES payment, ph, compared to the BAU. This
deforestation in turn changes the level of between-neighbours spatial spillovers compared to the
BAU. Specifically, lower deforestation in the X-patches due to a PES payment results in greater
deforestation in adjacent patches, whatever the patch type, relative to no PES payments. This is
the case because: ∂D
PESh
it
∂
∑
j∈[X] αijD
PESh
jt
< 0, ∀i.
Thus, by construction, there is always some leakage (TNT or TT) adjacent to each intervention
patch when there is a hotspot PES payment, ph. Indeed, the decrease in the neighbours’ defor-
estation will have a tendency to increase agent i deforestation. From Equation (9), we see that a
type-X patch surrounded by X-patches (dispersed case) tends to increase deforestation compared
to the BAU.
The avoided deforestation and leakage at the landscape scale following the PESh policy imple-
mentation are then:
ADPESht =
∑
i∈X
(D∗it −DPEShit ) +
∑
i∈X
(D∗it −DPEShit ) (10)
LPESht =
∑
i∈X
(D∗it −DPEShit )− (
∑
i∈X
(D∗i1 −DPEShi1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
TT Leakage
+
∑
i∈X
(D∗it −DPEShit ) +
∑
i∈X
(D∗i1 −DPEShi1 ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
TNT+NTNT Leakage
(11)
Thus, when a PES hotspot policy is implemented, any change in deforestation for agents with
low deforestation levels relative to BAU is only due to leakage (as they are not targeted by the
10ph>0.
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policy). In contrast, the change in deforestation for agents with high deforestation levels (hotspots)
is influenced by the PES and by the leakage between the various hotspots.11
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Under a PES implemented in deforestation hotspots, leakage is stronger when
agents are surrounded by neighbours with higher deforestation rates, but secondary NTNT leakage
may also take place between non treated. It follows that TT leakage is stronger in a clustered
case, while TNT leakage is stronger in a dispersed case. Finally, leakage is more important in a
high-interaction case.
Proof: Under a hotspot PES policy, only X-type agents are targeted. Thus, they are the only
agents experiencing a direct decrease of their BAU deforestation (∂D
PESh
it
∂ph
< 0, ∀i ∈ [X]). It follows
that leakage only comes from those agents in the first place. Then, given our spatial setting, leakage
impacts more X-type agents (TT leakage;∑i∈X(D∗it−DPEShit )−∑i∈X(D∗i1−DPEShi1 ) in a clustered
case, and X-type agents (TNT leakage; ∑i∈X(D∗it−DPEShit )+∑i∈X(D∗i1−DPEShi1 )) in a dispersed
case.
3.2 Full payment for environmental services policy
Under this full PES policy (PESf), we consider a PES payment pf that is offered to every agent
(both X and X):12
max
Dit
piit(Dit, Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1) + pf (DBAUit −Dit), ∀i ∈ [X,X] (12)
Where DBAUit is the deforestation level for agent i in the BAU scenario and pf is the individual
full PES incentive. We suppose here that pf is lower than ph (pf < ph), as the full PES payment
is spread over the whole set of agents rather than a sub-set.
The first-order conditions of the two kinds of agents define the equilibrium deforestation level
under the full PES policy:
∂piit
∂Dit
− pf = 0 ↔ DPESfit = Dit(Xit,
∑
j 6=i
DPESfjt , pf ) (13)
When the full PES payment pf is implemented, it is straightforward to see that all agents directly
reduce their deforestation levels. Furthermore, as all agents are concerned by the policy, only one
11The overall effect brings positive avoided deforestation only for small enough levels of spatial interactions. Con-
ceptually one could imagine spatial interactions large enough to overcome the impact of the policy.
12pf>0.
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type of leakage is left: TT leakage. Therefore, agents surrounded by X-agents will experience
larger leakage compared to the hotspot PES case. This is the case because: ∑j∈[X] αijDPEShjt <∑
j∈[X] αijD
PESf
jt and
∑
j∈[X] αijDPEShjt >
∑
j∈[X] αijD
PESf
jt .
The avoided deforestation and leakage at the landscape scale following the PESf policy imple-
mentation are then:
ADPESft =
∑
i
(D∗it −DPESfit ) (14)
LPESft =
∑
i
(D∗it −DPESfit )−
∑
i
(D∗i1 −DPESfi1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
TT leakage
(15)
We can see here that, compared to the PESh policy, leakage now comes from both types of
agents.
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Under a full PES policy, all agents reduce their deforestation. However, agents
surrounded by X-agents reduce their deforestation less than in a hotspot PES case. It follows that
leakage is stronger for X-agents (resp. weaker for X-agents) in the full PES case than in the
hotspot PES case. The net effect depends on spatial distribution: leakage is stronger (resp. weaker)
in the full PES case than in the hotspot PES case when agents are dispersed (resp. clustered).
Proof: Under a full PES, all agents including X-agents reduce directly their deforestation
(∂D
PESf
it
∂pf
< 0, ∀i). Becoming treated by the policy, they are therefore source of primary leakage
for their neighbours. In contrast, X-type agents are source of smaller leakage for their neighbours
compared to the hotspot PES case, as they receive a lower payment (pf < ph by assumption;
| ∂DPEShi∂ph |>|
∂DPESfi
∂pf
|, ∀i ∈ [X]). We directly obtain that there is more leakage (resp. less) in the
full PES case than in the hotspot PES case when agents are dispersed (resp. clustered).
The comparison between our two PES implementation is interesting to underline the conse-
quences in terms of leakage. While a strict definition of leakage would let think that implementing
a full PES policy is enough to get rid of leakage, our definition shows that this is more complex:
“classic” TNT leakage may disappear by construction under a full PES at the expense of TT
leakage.
11
Page 17 of 74
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
3.3 Conservation area policy
We now turn to the Conservation Area (CA) policy in which considering that the policy maker
rents the land from one particular agent i˜, and freezes the land so that no deforestation occurs.13
Deforestation in this case takes the form:
DCA
i˜t
= 0, ∀i = i˜ (16)
DCAit = Dit(Xi,
∑
j 6=i
αijD
CA
jt ), ∀i 6= i˜ (17)
The avoided deforestation and leakage at the landscape scale following the CA policy imple-
mentation are then:
ADCAt = D∗˜it +
∑
i 6=i˜
αij(D∗it −DCAit ) (18)
LCAt =
∑
i 6=i˜
αij(D∗it −DCAit )−
∑
i 6=i˜
αij(D∗i1 −DCAi1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
TNT+NTNT leakage
(19)
In this case, when policy efforts are concentrated in one area, leakage is also more geograph-
ically focused. Moreover, because by construction there is no TT leakage, we have the following
proposition:
Proposition 3: With a CA policy, the protected patch is the sole source of leakage. It follows
that leakage is concentrated around the conservation area. Leakage will therefore be more geograph-
ically concentrated than under hotspot and full PES schemes. Secondary NTNT negative leakage
may however spread as a second belt around direct neighbours of treated areas.
Proof: Under a CA policy, deforestation in the treated zone is imposed to 0. It follows that
primary TNT leakage will be by definition concentrated around that particular area. The increase
in deforestation in this surrounding zone may in turn create secondary spatial spillovers (NTNT
leakage) that can decrease deforestation in the second belt around the treatment area (through∑
i 6=i˜ αij(D∗it −DCAit )−
∑
i 6=i˜ αij(D∗i1 −DCAi1 )).
13We assume here that the cost of implementing protected areas corresponds to paying the opportunity cost of
this land. Yet, the actual cost of such policy may differ. Indeed, exclusion and enforcement costs would have to be
considered. In addition, the policy maker may choose not to compensate the agent deprived for his land use. Overall,
the actual cost can differ a lot from our hypothesis. Yet, we keep this assumption, as it allows a clear and easy
comparison between the various policies.
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3.4 Agglomeration bonus policy
The introduction of an Agglomeration Bonus (AB) policy may be of interest in dealing with
adjacent patches whilst providing a joint incentive between agents. The AB policy takes the form of
a two-part PES payment: a payment for individual avoided deforestation, a;14 and, a payment that
is an agglomeration bonus, which is proportional to previous deforestation in the neighbourhood,
b.15 For simplicity, we focus here on the hotspot patches (X-patches). Consequently, the payment
for individual avoided deforestation, a, and the agglomeration bonus, b, can thus counterbalance
leakage that was described in the hotspot PES policy (PESh) case.
The AB policy is then set from:
max
Dit
piit(Dit, Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1) + a(DBAUit −Dit) + b(
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1)Dit, ∀i ∈ [X] (20)
max
Dit
piit(Dit, Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1), ∀i ∈ [X] (21)
The first-order conditions of the two kinds of agents bring the equilibrium deforestation level
under the AB:
∂piit
∂Dit
− a+ b(
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1) = 0
↔ DABit = Dit(Xit,
∑
j∈[X]
αijD
AB
jt +
∑
j∈[X]
αijD
AB
jt , a, b(
∑
j 6=i
αijD
AB
jt−1)), ∀i ∈ [X] (22)
∂piit
∂Dit
= 0 ↔ DABit = Dit(Xit,
∑
j∈[X]
αijD
AB
jt +
∑
j∈[X]
αijD
AB
jt ), ∀i ∈ [X] (23)
One can see that increasing the agglomeration bonus b has two impacts on deforestation. First,
it decreases the impact of the treated neighbours’ deforestation, and thus it counterbalances the
spatial spillovers. One can thus expect that b will decrease TNT and TT leakage. Second, however,
one can show that increasing b also increases the marginal benefit from i’s own deforestation.
The avoided deforestation and leakage at the landscape scale following the AB policy imple-
mentation are then:
ADABt =
∑
i∈X
(D∗it −DABit ) +
∑
i∈X
(D∗it −DABit ) (24)
14a>0.
15b>0.
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LABt =
∑
i∈X
(D∗it −DABit )− (
∑
i∈X
(D∗i1 −DABi1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
TT leakage
+
∑
i∈X
(D∗it −DABit )−
∑
i∈X
(D∗i1 −DABi1 ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
TNT+NTNT leakage
(25)
One can see here that increasing the agglomeration bonus, b, indeed reduces leakage by re-
ducing the negative spatial interactions between neighbours. However, it also reduces the avoided
deforestation at the landscape scale.
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Leakage is decreasing in the AB policy. Leakage may even become negative for
sufficiently high levels of agglomeration bonus. However, the agglomeration bonus also decreases
avoided deforestation.
Proof: The agglomeration bonus, b, decreases the impact of the spatial interaction from the
neighbours. Leakage is thus decreasing in b. However, deforestation under the PES with a bonus
is increasing in the level of b: ∂D
AB
it
∂b =
∑
j 6=i αijDABjt−1 > 0.
Overall, the level of the agglomeration bonus, b, is negatively correlated to agent i neighbours’
deforestation: the bonus thus performs as expected and reduces leakage. However, if the agglom-
eration bonus is effective, it must also increase agent i?s own deforestation. Increasing the direct
payment, a, which is done at the expense of a higher total cost, counters this effect. It follows
that reducing leakage through an agglomeration bonus is made at the expense of reducing avoided
deforestation within the intervention area. The trade-off has to be considered carefully when im-
plementing such type of scheme.
4 Specification and simulations
4.1 Benchmark
Ours results hold for a general setting. Yet, in order to provide a concrete illustration, we
specify functional forms and calibrate the model. We make a number of simplifying assumptions
that allow us to ensure clarity of the model whilst not losing any of the key elements that need to
be captured.16
16Other types of setting could be specified that would fit with the results of the general model and could bring
possible extensions of this paper.
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As above, we consider two contrasting patterns of ex ante spatial distribution: clustered and
dispersed. These patterns are set for a 5 x 5 grid of 25 adjacent forest patches. Each cell corresponds
to one forest patch which is controlled by one agent. These two extreme spatial distributions allow
us to emphasize the role of spatial distribution in determining the pattern and extent of leakage.
We consider a simple recursive quadratic payoff function that satisfies the conditions described
in Section 2:
piit(Dit, Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1) = (βXit −
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1)Dit − 12D
2
it (26)
Thus revenues from deforestation, Dit, in the absence of any spatial interaction effects are simply
equal to the forest patch type, Xit, multiplied by some parameter β,17 then multiplied by the level
of deforestation Dit. The costs of deforestation are quadratic, increasing in Dit. This non-linearity
drives the result that agents typically do not deforest their full forest patch in the first period, and
so we have an interior solution. The presence of the interaction term, αij , potentially changes the
returns to deforestation.
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition of Equation (26) gives the optimal level
of deforestation D∗i for agent i:
D∗it = βXit −
∑
j 6=i
αijD
∗
jt−1 (27)
With regards to the avoided deforestation policies described in Section 3, results from this
specified model in terms of deforestation, avoided deforestation and leakage are given in Appendix
B.
For simulation purpose, we run the model for 10 periods to design BAU scenarios (Figure 2).
We distinguish four potential cases depending on whether similar patches are clustered (C) or dis-
persed (D), and whether there is high (H) or low (L) interaction: Clustered/Low-interaction (C/L),
Clustered/High-interaction (C/H), Dispersed/Low-interaction (D/L), Dispersed/High-interaction
(D/H). The results are given in terms of rates of deforestation for each patch each period.18 Pa-
rameters for the simulation analysis are given in Appendix C.1.19
17β > 0.
18Note that if our modeling was adapted to address forest degradation, these deforestation rates could be reinter-
preted as indicators of degradation intensity.
19Parameters were chosen here so that the agents in X-patches have positive rates of deforestation in the BAU,
while those in X-patches have negative rates (meaning they choose to reforest). This choice is made for presentation
purpose, as it is easier to distinguish each type on our landscape deforestation maps. It has no implication on the
nature of our results, which would be the same if both types of agents deforest in the BAU.
15
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***** Figure Business-as-usual deforestation dynamics here*********
Figure 2 can be understood in the following way. Ex ante, all forest patches of type X are
identical, and all of type X are identical. In the first period, because there is no prior deforestation,
all agents X-patches make the same deforestation choice, as do all agents in X-patches. There are
two types of edge effects. One is imposed by the topology of the simulation model which has a finite
number of forest patches such that some patches are at the model landscape boundary and others
are not. As such there are edge effects imposed by the spatially finite model structure.20 However,
of particular interest in this paper are the edge effects that come from forest patches being adjacent
to other forest patches where there are agents making active deforestation decisions.
From Figure 2, we can observe a number of dynamic transitions to different steady states
constant rates of deforestation depending on the assumptions over the spatial distribution. In the
C/L case, a steady state is reached after 5 periods. Agents on X-patches all deforest at the same
rate, whether they are adjacent to an edge, to another X-patch, or a X-patch. The choices of
agents on X-patches differ however depending on whether they are adjacent to at least one X-
patch, in which case they reforest; or only X-patch or an edge in which case they deforest. We
find cases of reforestation because of the negative spatial interactions from adjacent X-patches.
This reforestation creates a spatial interaction into X-patches at the bottom of the grid which are
adjacent either to other X-patches or to the boundary. In the C/H case, a steady state is reached
after 10 periods and is similar to the C/L case, though the equilibrium reflects a more complex
pattern of interactions. In the D/L case, a steady state is reached after 5 periods with patches of
reforestation alternating with patches of deforestation. Finally, in the D/H case, a steady state is
also reached after 5 periods; the pattern remains similar but with higher rates of deforestation and
higher rates of reforestation.
Differences in net deforestation Dt are driven almost entirely by the forest patch type, rather
than the spatial distribution of forest patches. This result is due to our model assumption of
homogeneous and linear interactions between adjacent X- and X-patches. Though the spatial dis-
tribution of deforestation is different in the two spatial cases, the overall rate of deforestation is
similar. Larger interactions tend to decrease deforestation for both types of agent whilst smaller in-
teractions reduce the variability of deforestation in time. More generally, larger spatial interactions
increase deforestation variability.
20We can imagine some national land outside the grid where αij = 0, where there is no scope for deforestation or
reforestation, perhaps an urban landscape, or perhaps a fully protected area of forest.
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4.2 Illustration of Propositions 1-4
Policies are implemented at t = 1 and the model runs for 10 periods. The policy calibration for
each of the policy option is provided in Appendix C.2. All policies are calibrated in order to generate
the same avoided deforestation at period t = 1.21 The only dynamic parameter in our setting is
the spatial externality driven by any policy implementation. Therefore, the following comparison
cannot be considered as an assessment of policy options per se, but only of their implications in
terms of leakage.
• PESh policy
An illustration of Proposition 1 is given in Figure 3 with low-interaction. Leakage is stronger
(resp. weaker) for X-agents than for X-agents in a clustered (resp. dispersed) case. We
can indeed see that leakage from X-agents is more than 4 times the one of X-agents in the
clustered case. In the dispersed case, leakage from X-agents is about 1.5 times stronger than
from X-agents.
***** Figure Leakage comparison between the X-agents and X-agents for the clustered case
(left) and the dispersed case (right) (low interactions) here*********
• PESf policy
In this case, the direct effect of the PES is higher as all agents are offered the payment
compared to only hotspot X-agents. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate Proposition 2, for a low-
interaction case.22 Leakage is weaker for X-agents (resp. stronger for X-agents) in the full
PES case than in the hotspot PES case. Leakage is weaker (resp. stronger) under a full PES
than under a hotspot PES in a clustered (resp. dispersed) case.
***** Figure Leakage comparison between the full PES and the hotspot PES policies for
X-agents (left) and X-agents (right) (low interactions/ clustered case) here*********
***** Figure Leakage comparison between the full PES and the hotspot PES policies for the
clustered case (left) and the dispersed case (right) (low interactions)here*********
• CA policy
21Thus ph, pf and a are set at different levels.
22However note that the difference in terms of leakage is very small in our simulations. This is due to the fact
that we assume homogeneous and linear interactions between X- and X-agents. The result would be different if we
assumed for instance stronger leakage between high-deforestation agents.
17
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As seen in Figures 6 and 7,23 leakage is concentrated around the CA in both the C/L case
and the D/L case. Second order effect can occur: the CA increases deforestation in the "first
belt" around (TNT leakage) which in turn has a spatial feedback on the "second belt" (NTNT
leakage) leading to decrease its deforestation.
***** Figure Leakage under the CA policy in the clustered case (low interactions)
here*********
***** Figure Leakage under the CA policy in the dispersed case (low interac-
tions)here*********
• AB policy
From Figure 8, we can observe that when b is increased (while a is fixed), leakage is reduced,
but overall avoided deforestation is lower. Thus, the direct payment a must be increased to
counter this, which increases the total cost of the policy.
***** Figure Leakage and avoided deforestation under the AB policy (b1 < b2 < b3 < b4)
(low interactions/ dispersed case) here*********
4.3 Policy comparison
In this subsection, we focus on comparing the four policies presented in Section 3, at the
landscape scale and for four spatial distributions (C/L, C/H, D/L, D/H). Our comparison first
considers the levels of avoided deforestation and leakage. Then, we will focus on the costs of the
policy, and finally, we will consider cost effectiveness.
4.3.1 Avoided deforestation and leakage at the landscape scale
For policy comparison, the respective Avoided Deforestation (AD) and Leakage (L) at the
landscape scale are displayed in Figure 9 and Figure 10.
Note first that the ranking of policy impacts depends on the spatial distribution that we consider
(Figure 9).24 When considering clustered cases, the AB policy is the most effective tool in terms
of avoided deforestation. Hotspot and full PES policies bring intermediate results, while the CA
policy is the less effective policy instrument. In contrast, in the dispersed cases, the CA policy
23Note that we use mapping here in the same manner as in Figure 2 to represent the impact of CA in terms of
leakage. This is more straightforward to figure out leakage in the CA case, and leakage is expressed in deforestation
intensity.
24It is important to note here that the results from the AB policy are using the same bonus calibration.
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becomes the most effective tool followed by the AB policy. Hotspot and full PES policies are
the least effective policy options. Finally, stronger interactions increase the variability of avoided
deforestation in time, especially for the CA policy case.
Looking at the impact of the different policies on leakage corroborates our findings. We find the
greatest level of leakage for the CA policy in a clustered case, and the least for the AB policy. In
contrast, in dispersed cases, the CA policy is associated with the lowest level of leakage. Hotspot
and full PES schemes result in the most leakage.
The CA policy has a very different impact, depending on the spatial distribution forest patches.
In a clustered case, the conservation area neighbours are also deforestation hotspots, and therefore
very sensitive to leakage. In a dispersed case, the conservation area neighbours are low-deforestation
type agents, and thus can be considered to act as buffer zones with respect to leakage. Both types
of PES schemes have similar results in terms of avoided deforestation and leakage due to the linear
form of our specified deforestation function.
***** Figure Avoided deforestation at the landscape scale here*********
***** Figure Leakage at the landscape scale here*********
4.3.2 Policy costs
The costs of the policies are set as follows:
• Hotspot PES policy (PESh): CPESht =
∑
i∈X ph(D∗it −DPEShit )
• Full PES policy (PESf): CPESft =
∑
i∈(X,X) pf (D∗it −DPESfit )
• Conservation Area policy (CA): CCAt = pii˜t
• Agglomeration Bonus policy (AB): CABt =
∑
i∈X(a(D∗it −DABit ) + b(
∑
j 6=iDABjt−1)Dit)
Total costs are displayed in Figure 11.
Hotspot and full PES schemes are always the least cost options amongst the four policy op-
tions.25 In a clustered case, the CA policy is the most costly option. This can be explained by
the fact that the CA policy requires to compensate the agent for its whole payoff in order to con-
serve its land, while hotspot and full PES schemes are implemented on a voluntary basis, therefore
distributing the cost of the policy more efficiently.
25We focus here on direct costs, and avoid to consider transaction costs, which may be very high for PES imple-
mentation.
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In a dispersed case, the AB policy is the most costly policy option. This is because X-agents
receive neither a PES payment nor an agglomeration bonus. It follows that controlling leakage
is more costly in this case. Moreover, stronger interactions increase the variability of the results
across time.
***** Figure Costs here*********
4.3.3 Cost effectiveness
To complete our policy comparisons, we present some cost effectiveness results of our simu-
lations. We consider first the level of avoided deforestation per unit cost (Figure 12): ADt/Ct.
One can see here that PES are the most cost-effective tools. In contrast, CA tends to be the
least cost-effective option, except for the dispersed case and especially with high interactions. This
result is in line with the literature arguing that policies relying on price signals (such as PES) are
more efficient than command-and-control policies (such as CA). AB policy brings an intermediate
cost-efficiency.
We also consider the level of leakage per unit cost, Lt/Ct (Figure 13). In this case, PES schemes
are the policies that result in the highest level of leakage per unit cost. In contrast, lower levels of
leakage are associated with CA and AB policies per unit spent in the policy. In particular, a CA
policy option counterbalances to some extent the lack of price efficiency in the dispersed case with
high interactions. This result brings an interesting insight: policies that appear to be the most
cost-effective at the project level may result in high levels of leakage, reducing the effectiveness of
the policy at a landscape level.
***** Figure Avoided deforestation per unit costs here*********
***** Figure Leakage per unit costs here*********
5 Conclusion
Governments in LMICs that engage in REDD+ initiatives typically implement avoided defor-
estation and forest degradation policies that may directly or indirectly influence the drivers of forest
loss. A key concern that has been extensively voiced is that efforts to reduce forest loss in one lo-
cation may result in deforestation and forest degradation being displaced to another location, that
is leakage. Indeed, leakage is a frequently mentioned as a shortcoming of REDD+ implementation,
both at the local and the international levels. In this paper, we consider several avoided deforesta-
tion policy options, explicitly addressing avoided deforestation, leakage and the costs of the policy.
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We apply our analysis to different spatial landscapes whilst expanding the definition of leakage
by considering both treated and non treated zones, that depicts what is at stake both within and
outside policy intervention adjacent areas. Our paper makes to make several contributions to the
existing literature on the design of policies for forest conservation. Several interesting findings can
be found from our analytical model and simulations.
First, leakage is sensitive to the interaction of the specific REDD+ policy and the spatial dis-
tribution of forest patch types. For example, our model suggests that the efficacy of a conservation
area depends critically on whether the landscape is homogeneous (clustered) or heterogeneous (dis-
persed). In the former case, our model predicts the highest level of leakage compared to the other
policies addressed in the latter there is the least leakage. Under a targeted hotspot PES policy,
the spatial distribution of leakage depends again on whether forest patches of the same type are
clustered or dispersed.
Second, the targeted hotspot and non-targeted full PES policy schemes are the least cost option
for reducing deforestation; and are the most effective tool in terms of avoided deforestation under
a fixed budget. It follows that if the policy maker sets its short-term objective in terms of level of
avoided deforestation at the landscape scale depends again on whether forest patches of the same
type are clustered or dispersed (AB) and conservation area (CA) policies are best in a clustered case
and a dispersed case respectively. However, PES schemes are most effective if the policy maker
objective is to minimise costs of avoided deforestation at the policy landscape, whilst ignoring
leakage.
Finally, we show that the intensity of the interactions unambiguously tend to increase the
variability over time of the avoided deforestation at the landscape scale. This result gives the
insight that avoided deforestation policies need to be assessed in the long run, with sufficiently
long periods of observation, in order to avoid focusing on short-term episodes, particularly when
interactions are strong. Though we model spatial analysis of deforestation with localized leakage,
our analysis is relevant to any public good provision with spatial interactions in which the action
of an agent has a direct impact on their neighbours’ payoffs.
We conclude with two final observations. First, we assume perfect monitoring of deforestation.
Yet in reality monitoring is costly, often imperfect, and monitoring costs most likely are a function
of location. The spatial distribution of enforcement activities will in turn affect spatial spillovers,
an important consideration for sizing and siting conservation areas (Robinson et al., 2011; Pfaff and
Robalino, 2012; Sims, 2014). Second, forests provide a multitude of ecosystem services in addition
to carbon sequestration. Habitat fragmentation in particular affects the ability of forested areas to
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provide biodiversity benefits (Pfaff and Robalino, 2012; Sims, 2014). Our model can be adapted to
address such issues of both total forest cover and contiguous spatial patterns.
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Appendix A. Set of leakage situations
Our patch specification and our reduced form for deforestation profit are designed to fit a variety
of cases where leakage can take place. Yet, diverse interpretations of our model can be made.
Appendix A.1. Local market-based leakage
Consider here that each patch represents one agent’s unit of land in the landscape. We assume
that all agents sell their products on the same market. Thus, the price at which they sell the
products from deforestation is: p(Dt). The profit from deforestation by agent i can thus be written:
piit = p(Dt)Dit − c(Dit) (28)
As long as larger supply tends to decrease the price of products ( ∂p∂Dt<0), this problem can
be reduced as in Equation (1). In this case, αij can be considered as an indicator of the price
elasticity of demand. If all agents have the same access to markets and the same supply influence,
one can consider that αij = α, ∀i, j. Yet, one can consider that the law of unique price may
not hold, this is why we keep potentially heterogeneous αij . Indeed, reduced deforestation due to
the implementation of a policy option for example is likely to increase nearby deforestation when
product markets are not functioning efficiently, but have no local impact when markets are efficient.
This case is developed in Robinson et al. (2011).
By extension, the model would also fit with international market-based leakage. In this case,
consider that one patch is a country, and that the land-use decision is made by one representative
agent. Here again, αij is an indicator of the price elasticity of demand, and the heterogeneity
between the αij depends on the level of market integration: poor market integration may mean
that only close neighbours will have an impact on the price in region i, while perfect market
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integration would come with a unique price (and thus homogeneous spatial interactions) within the
set of countries.
Appendix A.2. Activity-shifting leakage
Consider here that each patch represents one agent’s unit of land and suppose that households
can migrate from one patch to adjacent patches. One possible mechanism for a localized leakage
could be whereby reduced deforestation in one patch following the implementation of a policy
option results in less agricultural land than there would otherwise be, and thus decreased demand
for agricultural labourers in that patch, leading to localized out-migration to adjacent patches which
then experience a surfeit of agricultural labourers relative to the status quo, making agriculture
more attractive and thus increasing deforestation. Reduced labour demand in one patch has an
influence on the labour supply and thus labour cost in its neighbourhood with depressing wages,
which somehow comes back to Equation (1).
By extension, the model would also fit with regards to a within-property situation that is more
conventional that the previous situation in terms of activity-shifting leakage. In this case, consider
that only one agent owns all the patches of the landscape. His goal may be to allocate labour
between all patches in order to maximize his expected profit. As long as our agent has poor access
to labour markets, the allocation of labour in any patch j has an influence on labour allocated
to patch i, and thus on his expected profit: there is an opportunity cost of allocating labour in i
instead of j. In this case, αij can be considered as an indicator of transport costs from patch i to
patch j. This case is developed in Delacote and Angelsen (2015).
Appendix B. Results from the specified form
Appendix B.1. PESh policy
In our specified framework, agent i’s deforestation under the PESh policy is:
DPEShit = βXit −
∑
j 6=i
αijD
PESh
jt−1 − ph, ∀i ∈ [X] (29)
DPEShit = βXit −
∑
j 6=i
αijD
PESh
jt−1 , ∀i ∈ [X] (30)
The avoided deforestation and leakage at the landscape scale following the PESh policy imple-
mentation are then:
ADPESht =
∑
i∈X
ph −
∑
i
[
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗jt−1 −DPEShjt−1 )] (31)
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LPESht =
∑
i∈X
ph −
∑
i
[
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗jt−1 −DPEShjt−1 )]− (
∑
i∈X
ph −
∑
i
[
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗j0 −DPEShj0 )]) (32)
Appendix B.2. PESf policy
In our specified framework, agent i’s deforestation under the PESf policy is:
DPESfit = βXit −
∑
j 6=i
αijD
PESf
jt−1 − pf , ∀i ∈ [X,X] (33)
The avoided deforestation and leakage at the landscape scale following the PESf olicy imple-
mentation are then:
ADPESft =
∑
i
[pf − (
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗jt−1 −DPESfjt−1 ))] (34)
LPESft =
∑
i
[pf − (
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗jt−1 −DPESfjt−1 ))]− (
∑
i
[pf − (
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗j0 −DPESfj0 ))]) (35)
Appendix B.3. CA policy
In our specified framework, agent i’s deforestation under the CA policy is:
DCA
i˜t
= 0, ∀i = i˜ (36)
DCAit = βXit −
∑
j 6=i
αijD
CA
jt−1, ∀i 6= i˜ (37)
The avoided deforestation and leakage at the landscape scale following the CA policy imple-
mentation are then:
ADCAt = D∗˜it −
∑
i
[
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗jt−1 −DCAjt−1)] (38)
LCAt = −
∑
i
[
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗jt−1 −DCAjt−1) +
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗j0 −DCAj0 )] (39)
Appendix B.4. AB policy
In our specified framework, agent i deforestation under the AB policy is:
DABit = βXit − (1− b)
∑
j 6=i
αijD
AB
jt−1 − a, ∀i ∈ [X] (40)
DABit = βXit −
∑
j 6=i
αijD
AB
jt−1, ∀i ∈ [X] (41)
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The avoided deforestation and leakage at the landscape scale following the AB policy imple-
mentation are then:
ADABt =
∑
i∈X
[a− (
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗jt−1 −DABjt−1)− bDABjt−1)] (42)
−
∑
i∈X
[
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗jt−1 −DABjt−1)]
LABt =
∑
i∈X
[a− (
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗jt−1 −DABjt−1)− bDABjt−1)] (43)
−
∑
i∈X
[
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗jt−1 −DABjt−1)]
− (
∑
i∈X
[a− (
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗j0 −DABj0 )− bDABj0 )]
−
∑
i∈X
[
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗j0 −DABj0 )])
Appendix C. Simulation parameters
Appendix C.1. Parameter values
Parameter Value
β 1
X 5
X 0
α 0.05
α 0.1
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Appendix C.2. Policy calibration: same avoided deforestation at t = 1
Parameter C/L C/H D/L D/H
ph 0.327 0.295 0.3654 0.3465
pf 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.18
a 0.409 0.443 0.433 0.433
b 0.0059 0.0059 0.0059 0.0059
b1 0.003
b2 0.00586
b3 0.007
b4 0.009
Figures
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Figure 1: Expanding the concept of leakage
No Policy 
Spatial Spillovers
Policy Intervention
Policy-induced Spatial Spillovers
 Leakage
TNT Leakage
Treated → Non Treated 
TT Leakage
Treated → Treated
NTNT Leakage
Non Treated → Non treated
Primary Leakage
Secondary Leakage
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Figure 2: Business-as-usual deforestation dynamics
Deforestation Intensity
BAU deforestation in the clustered case with low interactions
T=1 T=5 T=10
BAU deforestation in the clustered case with high interactions
T=1 T=5 T=10
BAU deforestation in the dispersed case with low interactions
T=1 T=5 T=10
BAU deforestation in the dispersed case with high interactions
T=1 T=5 T=10
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Figure 3: Leakage comparison between the X-agents and X-agents for the clustered case (left) and
the dispersed case (right) (low interactions)
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Figure 4: Leakage comparison between the full PES and the hotspot PES policies for X-agents
(left) and X-agents (right) (low interactions/ clustered case)
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Figure 5: Leakage comparison between the full PES and the hotspot PES policies for the clustered
case (left) and the dispersed case (right) (low interactions)
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Figure 6: Leakage under the CA policy in the clustered case (low interactions)
Leakage Intensity
T=1 T=5
Figure 7: Leakage under the CA policy in the dispersed case (low interactions)
Leakage Intensity
T=1 T=5 T=10
30
Page 36 of 74
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Figure 8: Leakage and avoided deforestation under the AB policy (b1 < b2 < b3 < b4) (low
interactions/ dispersed case)
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Figure 9: Avoided deforestation at the landscape scale
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Figure 10: Leakage at the landscape scale
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Figure 11: Costs
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Figure 12: Avoided deforestation per unit costs
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Figure 13: Leakage per unit costs
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